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Abstract: Theories about Third Space or “in-betweeness” often lack 
an ethics that responds to the position of the majority of people 
who experience the violence of colonialism, as Amar Acheraïou 
argues. How can we think about hybridity with a more commit-
ted ethics? Hari Kunzru’s The Impressionist suggests that much of 
the violence experienced by humans and animals under dominant 
or colonial thought stems from a traditional view of subjectivity 
as fixed, stable, knowable, distinct, and independent from others 
and the material world. Colonial logic views as “disposable” those 
regarded as not human or somehow less than human and often 
sacrifices them in order to maintain a stable, dominant notion 
of subjectivity, an exclusionary definition of Man, a continuous 
flow of extractionary capital from the colonies, and a particular 
hierarchy or ordering of the world. This article argues that The 
Impressionist portrays subjectivity not as fixed but in process, after 
Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming animal,” as a way to challenge 
dominant thinking. The novel also emphasizes the nonhuman 
nature of subjectivity and human dependence on the nonhuman, 
including the environment, for existence. The Impressionist offers 
an important corrective to concepts of hybridity by emphasiz-
ing that those humans and nonhumans regarded as “disposable” 
demand ethical treatment.
Keywords: hybridity, subjectivity, becoming animal, postcolonial 
ecocriticism, The Impressionist
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As [Val] Plumwood argues, the western definition of human-
ity depended—and still depends—on the presence of the ‘not-
human’: the uncivilised, the animal and animalistic. European 
justification for invasion and colonisation proceeded from this 
basis, understanding non-European lands and the people and 
animals that inhabited them as ‘spaces’, ‘unused, underused or 
empty.’
Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin,  
Postcolonial Ecocriticism (5)
Critics of Hari Kunzru’s The Impressionist have discussed the novel’s 
emphasis on identity formation and its treatment of postcolonial “in-
betweeness” and hybridity as the protagonist, son of English colonial 
officer Forrester and Indian mother Amrita, often finds himself outside 
categories of binary logic. The novel is composed with many of the con-
cepts about hybrid space developed by postcolonial theorists in mind; as 
critic Murat Aydemir comments, “the narrative tries out, tries on, differ-
ent conceptualizations of inter- or cross-cultural identity” (205). While 
the novel is certainly focused on these cultural questions of identity con-
struction, critics have not taken into account the significant relation-
ship between subjectivity and materiality or the nonhuman, including 
animals, that The Impressionist posits. Traditional, dominant notions of 
the subject offer a fixed, knowable essence with a privileged interiority 
demarcated by clear boundaries and possessing a kind of mastery over 
one’s body and other nonhuman matter; The Impressionist posits ways of 
thinking differently to challenge this colonial logic and its effects. As an 
extension of this thinking differently, The Impressionist calls for ethical 
responses to the nonhuman and those regarded as “disposable bodies” 
(Braidotti), a more robust ethics that several “in-between” concepts—
hybridity, mimicry, and becoming animal—lack.
This essay offers a vitalist reading of The Impressionist drawing on the 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, to which the text seems to allude 
at various turns in the narrative. In the course of this vitalist reading, I 
discuss theorists like Donna Haraway and Rosi Braidotti for their cri-
tiques of Deleuze and Guattari’s project, as well as Braidotti’s modifica-
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tions and extensions of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought: for example, 
Braidotti’s view of “becoming animal” takes an even more animal-cen-
tric and perhaps a more material or environmentally-centered approach 
than their concept, as does Haraway’s concept of “becoming with.” This 
essay reviews other discussions of the novel that emphasize the impor-
tant issues of hybridity and mimicry, arguing that these topics should 
be considered in relation to “becoming animal” and the novel’s clear 
attempt to think about the nonhuman outside of colonial logic. Citing 
Amar Acheraïou’s critique of the concept of hybridity for its ambiva-
lence and its history of complicity with colonialism and racism (as well 
as some of its theorists’ complicity with colonialism and racism), I argue 
that The Impressionist posits “becoming animal,” with its unwavering 
commitment to positively value difference, as a more ethical approach 
for thinking about the position of mixed-race people in a postcolonial 
context.
Rethinking the Subject and the Nonhuman
The Impressionist presents a fictional colonial India where some charac-
ters adopt dominant notions of subjectivity and the nonhuman while 
others attempt to think differently. For example, the narrator’s descrip-
tions often emphasize the interconnectivity between vitalist notions of 
matter and non-dominant subjectivity. Set in early twentieth-century 
India, the novel begins with the incidental meeting of a British colonial 
officer named Forrester, whose mission is to plant trees in India, and 
a young Indian woman named Amrita who takes opium and is being 
taken across the desert for an arranged marriage that is of no interest to 
her. This opening scene emphasizes the nonhuman or material forces in-
volved in the chance meeting between Forrester and Amrita and there-
fore challenges notions of human mastery over bodies and matter. That 
is, the attempt to control Amrita’s life and future through the arranged 
marriage is upset, albeit briefly, by the way the flood brings her and 
Forrester together, leading to miscegenation. As the narrator describes, 
their sex act and resultant child develop from the singularity of the char-
acters, location, forces, and speeds that lead to the event: the chance 
flood during the monsoon season, Forrester’s desire that sends him to 
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the south of India, Amrita’s hatred of train travel and her opium habit, 
the presence of a cave. All of these forces and more set off a Latourian 
cascade of human and nonhuman actors leading the two characters to 
the safety of a cave where they conceive the half-caste child Pran, the 
protagonist of The Impressionist. Beginning with this scene of non-tel-
eological human and nonhuman agency, the novel moves from Pran’s 
unplanned birth to follow his movements through various locations, 
communities, and identities in a way that challenges the viability of 
traditional notions of subjectivity in favor of becoming.
As mentioned, Aydemir traces and briefly summarizes some of the 
theoretical concepts that The Impressionist employs: hybridity, travesty, 
mimicry, and nomadism. While Aydemir nicely describes how Deleuze 
and Guattari’s nomadism is treated in the novel, he has not considered 
this concept in relation to the more important concept in A Thousand 
Plateaus of “becoming” and “becoming animal.”1 The Impressionist 
clearly takes up this concept through the novel’s descriptions of charac-
ters’ interactions with numerous animals, including mules, goats, pigs, 
horses, tigers, ducks, camels, and a cow. “Becoming animal” challenges 
dominant notions of subjectivity by replacing “being” with the more 
fluid and processual “becoming.” In The Impressionist, Kunzru positions 
“becoming animal” as a more viable and critical mode of in-betweenness 
for challenging dominant thinking than mimicry or hybridity; however, 
the novel does not merely adopt Deleuze and Guattari’s concept in a 
straightforward fashion but offers important critiques of this concept, 
demonstrating the need for more ethical response to others. 
Braidotti summarizes the fluid nature of “becoming” nicely: “Deleuzian 
becoming is the affirmation of the positivity of difference meant as a 
multiple and constant process of transformation. Both teleological order 
and fixed identities are relinquished in favor of a flux of multiple becom-
ing” (Nomadic Subjects 246). The lack of teleology in “becoming” then 
results, at least in part, from the uncertainties and unknowns that occur 
from the affectivity of bodies and material forces. As Braidotti points 
out elsewhere, there is a connection between thinking about subjectivity 
and the nonhuman: “Freud’s and Darwin’s insights about the structures 
of subjectivity opened up a profound nonhumanness at the heart of the 
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subject” (“Animals, Anomalies” 528). Jane Bennet also reminds us that 
“[m]y ‘own’ body is material, and yet this vital materiality is not fully or 
exclusively human’” (112). Kunzru’s novel emphasizes the idea that how 
one construes subjects correlates with one’s ideas about the nonhuman.
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that subjectivity as process often in-
cludes vacillations between adopting dominant, fixed subjectivities and 
moving more toward transformational approaches to the subject; their 
words might aptly describe the protagonist’s movements through the 
novel as at times he adopts a dominant subjectivity and at others ap-
proaches more of a becoming:
[O]ne will often be forced to take dead ends, to work with 
signifying powers and subjective affections, to find a foothold 
in formations that are Oedipal or paranoid or even worse, rid-
gified territorialities that open the way for other transforma-
tional operations. . . . In other cases, on the contrary, one will 
bolster oneself directly on a line of flight enabling one to blow 
apart strata, cut roots, and make new connections. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 14–15)
The protagonist of The Impressionist follows this kind of trajectory as 
he sometimes moves from a “line of flight,” like in the scene where he 
and the tigers escape the kingdom of Fatehpur, to an Oedipal situation, 
when he is essentially adopted as a replacement for the Macfarlanes’ 
dead sons. As he fluctuates between approaching various becomings to 
adopting more dominant subjectivities, the novel acknowledges the dif-
ficulties and dangers of “becoming animal” in heavily entrenched domi-
nant or arborescent cultures. 
For an example of a dominant thinker in the novel, I return to the 
opening scene and to Forrester. After his sexual encounter with Amrita, 
the narrator describes Forrester’s actions: 
Then, in an instant, something tiny sparks in Forrester’s brain. 
This small thing cascades into something larger and potentially 
threatening and he takes a shot at giving it a name and fails, 
though he thinks it may be something to do with duty and 
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India Office ordinances, and this thing that now seems enor-
mous and important and panic inducing makes him leap to 
his feet and stagger backward . . . it makes Forrester look at the 
girl wildly and understand nothing about where he is and why, 
except to know that he has changed everything about his life 
and cannot see where it will lead. (Kunzru 13)
For Forrester, the effect of this idea, which seems to result from taboos 
against miscegenation, is not unlike the force of the flood. That is, the 
passage emphasizes the power of a semiotic force—the power of an idea 
causes a cascade—directly after the material cascade of the flood and the 
character’s bodily drives or desires.2 In response to his transformation 
and newfound lack of a clear teleology after having sex with Amrita, 
not knowing “where it will lead,” Forrester throws himself back into the 
flood after a tree in the rapids. The scene suggests that after his vision 
of an open-ended future, a different way of thinking about his life, 
Forrester’s desire to return to the arborescent, to a life with a clear pur-
pose and planned trajectory, causes his death. Kunzru emphasizes in this 
scene how miscegenation functions as an illegitimate act in arborescent 
culture, which demands order and a clear filial lineage. The miscegena-
tion is viewed as taboo, causing Forrester’s view of order, hierarchy, and 
progress to be thrown into question. In this scene, Forrester approaches 
a becoming in opposition to the arborescent notion of a stable subject 
with which he is familiar as he and Amrita’s bodies compose a relating 
not unlike the orchid and wasp of Deleuze and Guattari’s project. The 
lack of teleology and fixed identity he experiences in becoming produces 
an uncertainty that undoes his purpose and his role in the colonial mis-
sion. His inability to deal with this lack of order leads to his death. 
In contrast to this teleological view of life, the astrologer’s reading of 
Pran’s future at his birth describes a life much more open-ended, a life 
that highlights becoming. The practice of the astrologer in taking into 
account the positions of stars also emphasizes nonhuman material forces 
and their effects, critiquing human-centered visions of agency: 
The chart was strange and frightening. The stars had contorted 
themselves, wrung themselves into a frightening shape. Their 
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pattern of influences had no equilibrium. It was skewed toward 
passion and change. To the astrologer this distribution looked 
impossible. Forces tugged in all directions, the malefic quali-
ties of the moon and Saturn auguring transmutations of every 
kind. It was a shapeshifting chart. A chart full of lies. . . . The 
boy’s future was obscure. (21)
Where Forrester seems to have desired a life with a clear teleology, the 
protagonist’s chart suggests open-endedness. As the astrologer throws 
away this controversial reading and offers Pran’s “father,” Amrita’s ar-
ranged husband Pandit Razdan, an average and more banal reading 
instead so that he might receive a higher tip, the novel offers another 
example of a human attempt to present as factual a false narrative that 
contradicts material evidence. As Pran’s (mis)adventures make clear, the 
first reading was much more accurate and the astrologer’s attempt to 
mislead Pandit Razdan is undermined by the nonhuman material forces 
that exceed the narrative and its closure.
Similarly, the protagonist’s unconscious drives and desires upset his 
mother’s narrative of his genealogy as Pandit Razdan’s son, which is her 
attempt to offer him as a legitimate child. In reaching for the body of 
the servant Anjali’s daughter, Pran’s action sets off another cascade of 
events: the frustrated mother, Anjali, who desires to protect her daugh-
ter from Pran, punishes him by producing the picture of Forrester that 
shows a great likeness to Pran. This serves as evidence that Pran is a 
bastard and supports the story she tells to Pandit Razdan about Amrita’s 
meeting with Forrester prior to their marriage. The scene suggests the 
ways in which bodily desire or unconscious forces upset the mastery of 
narrative closure. Braidotti discusses the instability of narrative in light 
of the unconscious: “The awareness of unconscious processes translates 
into the recognition of the instability and lack of coherence of the nar-
ratives that compose the social text” (Nomadic Subjects 84). In other 
words, characters’ desires (and other nonhumans or nonhuman things) 
contradict narratives of purity and colonial mastery and point to multi-
plicity, movement, hybridity, and assemblages. Conventional narratives 
are revealed as fictions that elide anomalies and inconsistencies, giving a 
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simple picture of what is a more complex, fluid world. The upsetting of 
Amrita’s narrative about Pran’s lineage results in perhaps the most drastic 
change for the protagonist, as his father removes the bastard “son” from 
his home and privileged position where Pran is “supremely convinced of 
his [own] central position in the cosmos” (Kunzru 23). The Impressionist 
critiques photography and hunting, in addition to narrative fixity, for 
having similar aims of arresting mobility and possible becomings.
The protagonist of The Impressionist, who is first named Pran and 
later adopts several other identities like Pretty Bobby and Jonathan 
Bridgeman, finds himself repeatedly caught up in arborescent systems, 
which for Deleuze and Guattari attempt to fix people as subjects into an 
ordered world. Marked as Other and different, Pran often experiences 
the violence and racism that these hierarchical systems impose. For ex-
ample, Reverend Macfarlane offers racist comments about the protago-
nist’s limited capacity for learning because of his “half-caste” identity. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming calls attention to the fiction of 
fixed identities both ontologically and politically: “Becoming produces 
nothing other than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that 
you either imitate or you are. What is real is the becoming itself, the 
block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that 
which becomes passes. Becoming can and should be qualified as be-
coming-animal even in the absence of a term that would be the animal 
become” (238). Becoming offers a way out of fixed notions of being 
and calls attention to the reality that exceeds definition or classification. 
Dominant thinkers in the novel like Forrester and Rev. Macfarlane, who 
“never had the capacity for vagueness” (Kunzru 182), desire fixity above 
all else; as an alternative, becoming embraces as positive the processual 
and contaminating nature of the world.
Beyond Mimicry and Hybridity
I have so far argued that becoming offers a more accurate picture of 
the subject that acknowledges its nonhumanness than those concepts 
that view the human subject as fixed and closed off from matter, others, 
and the environment. Thinking about the subject as distinct or separate 
from the environment rather than as part of and dependent upon it, 
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as in becoming, leads to the instrumentalization of people and land in 
colonialism. Before turning to a discussion of the protagonist’s “becom-
ing animal,”3 however, it is necessary to elaborate on the distinction 
between mimicry and becoming, which is significant for Deleuze and 
Guattari. As several critics and the narrator of The Impressionist make 
clear, the protagonist is an expert at mimicry, and he exhibits this early 
on in the novel when it is suggested that his uncle’s stroke may have 
been caused in part by his “imitating the sound of a wild animal” (23). 
At this point in the novel, Pran is still in the privileged position of a 
wealthy male in Pandit Razdan’s house, and this practice of mimicry 
does not challenge fixed subjectivity. This mimicry does nothing to un-
dermine the naturality of his subject position, and it is not until later in 
the novel when he is removed from his “father’s” house that he experi-
ences the violence of classification and begins to think differently. While 
he later experiences “becoming animal” as a way to resist or escape this 
classificatory violence, his imitation of a wild animal at this early place 
in the novel is not “becoming animal” but mere mimicry.
Mimicry figures importantly in postcolonial theory and in relation to 
subjectivity, as Homi Bhabha describes in his chapter “Of Mimicry and 
Man.” In his analysis of a text written by Charles Grant, chairman of the 
British East India Company, Bhabha reveals how Grant demonstrated
partly a belief in political reform along Christian lines and 
partly an awareness that the expansion of company rule in India 
required a system of subject formation—a reform of manners, 
as Grant put it—that would provide the colonial with ‘a sense 
of personal identity as we know it’.  .  .  . Grant paradoxically 
implies that it is the ‘partial’ diffusion of Christianity, and the 
‘partial’ influence of moral improvements which will construct 
a particularly appropriate form of colonial subjectivity. (124) 
This desire to create a manageable subjectivity that is “as we know it” 
suggests the desire for control over colonized peoples by implementing 
a dominant notion of subjectivity, which makes them transparent and 
present to the knowledge and reason of the colonizer. Foucault’s de-
scription of classical language also emphasizes this view of transparency: 
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“[D]iscourse is that translucent necessity through which representation 
and beings must pass—as beings are represented to the mind’s eye, and 
as representation renders beings visible in their truth” (311). One way 
out of this dominant notion of subjectivity, a notion which attempts to 
render the subject as fully known and present to observation, is becom-
ing and the necessary uncertainties and mystery involved in becoming 
that cannot be fixed by representation. Pran approaches various becom-
ings throughout The Impressionist to escape this colonial and dominant 
logic.Through a quotation of Grant’s text, Bhabha also points out that 
this subjectivity is “an empty form of ‘the imitation of English manners’” 
(124; emphasis in original), which follows along with his reading of 
mimicry as “the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject 
of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (122; emphasis in 
original). Mimicry in this context posits a way for the colonized to be 
managed but also assuages fears of sameness or a leveling of hierarchy in 
the “not quite.” Bhabha continues in this vein explaining the unthought 
of the colonial man. He argues:
The ‘unthought’ across which colonial man is articulated is that 
process of classificatory confusion that I have described as the 
metonymy of the substitutive chain of ethical and cultural dis-
course. This results in the splitting of colonial discourse so that 
two attitudes towards external reality persist; one takes reality 
into consideration while the other disavows it and replaces it by 
a product of desire that repeats, rearticulates ‘reality’ as mim-
icry. (130; emphasis in original) 
Bhabha goes on to explain that this desire to have the colonized as same 
for the purposes of management but also different for the narcissistic 
purposes of maintaining a belief in European superiority is the reason 
for racist jokes like those about non-English people and bestiality; he 
also explains that the colonizers can believe the jokes because of this 
splitting. That is, the colonist wants the colonized to have an English 
subjectivity that is the same as his own, a dominant subjectivity that he 
fully knows, so that the colonized is more easily controlled and man-
aged; yet this turning of colonized people into the same is threatening 
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to English supremacy since, if too successful, colonized people could be 
seen as equals. Therefore, for Bhabha, racist jokes do the work of exag-
gerating difference to uphold the existing hierarchy. 
These disavowals of reality can be seen in The Impressionist in the 
scenes where Rev. MacFarlane compares his miscegenation to bestiality 
and where he dismisses the strong evidence of the protagonist’s intel-
ligence in favor of believing his narrative of his sons’ intellectual supe-
riority to Indians, a category in which he places the hybrid protagonist. 
Given the taboos about bestiality, the jokes that Bhabha mentions and 
Macfarlane’s characterization of his sex with an Indian woman are exam-
ples of how English culture attempts to preserve the category of human 
for white adult males, excluding others by degrees based on race. Since 
sexual practices are one area that attempts to maintain a boundary be-
tween human and animal, the jokes and characterizations surrounding 
sex seek to animalize or dehumanize non-English people. Indeed, in 
an American context, Colleen Glenney Boggs describes how in seven-
teenth century New England some settlers viewed Native Americans 
as beastlike: “For [John] Winthrop,” Boggs writes, “Native Americans 
inhabit a middle ground between men and beasts—that is, a category 
of similitude in which they are ‘beastlike’ despite being ‘men’. . . . The 
prohibitions against bestiality thus also regulate sexual intercourse with 
‘beastlike’ Native Americans” (61). Boggs also notes that “[t]he anxiety 
about bestiality seems tied to concerns about miscegenation” (215). In 
this colonial and Eurocentric logic, taboos against bestiality extended to 
include those humans who were marked as somehow less than human 
via racism. 
In The Impressionist, the narrator describes Macfarlane’s racism and 
his majoritarian thinking along with his remorse for his miscegena-
tion in a way that confirms his animalization of native people: “Today’s 
lower races showed such distinct and separate characteristics that one 
could hardly help concluding they were actually a separate species, de-
scendants of these less human men. All this made crossing doubly un-
natural, no better than bestiality. How he had fallen!” (Kunzru 187). 
Macfarlane’s situating of, in his terms, “lower races” with animals falls in 
line with a prejudice in the Western natural history tradition. For exam-
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ple, in an extract from their Types of Mankind of Ethnological Researches, 
titled “Hybridity of Animals, viewed in connection with the Natural 
History of Mankind,” Josiah Clark Nott and George Robins Gliddon 
maintain that “the White Man and the Negro were distinct ‘species’” 
(42). Fred Myers also notes how museum practices in the twentieth 
century performed a racist animalization of natives via the category of 
“primitive art”: 
[N]on-Western and prehistoric art, ‘primitive art’ .  .  . was 
most obviously within the purview of anthropological study 
and was exhibited in ethnographic or natural history rather 
than ‘fine art’ museums. One consequence of this placement, 
noted by many, has been the popular identification of Native 
American cultures (for example) not with other human cre-
ations, but with the natural plant and animal species of a con-
tinent. (Myers 268) 
Macfarlane conflates those he regards as less than human and nonhuman 
animals in line with the popular racist thinking that Myers highlights. 
Explaining how the civilizing mission constitutes the colonial as a 
“partial presence,” Bhabha emphasizes the difference between mimicry 
and the European unthought: “[M]imicry rearticulates presence in 
terms of its ‘otherness,’ that which it disavows. There is a crucial dif-
ference between this colonial articulation of man and his doubles and 
that which Foucault describes as ‘thinking the unthought’ which, for 
nineteenth century Europe, is the ending of man’s alienation by rec-
onciling him with his essence” (130; emphasis in original). In draw-
ing attention to this distinction, Bhabha points to this “other scene” 
of European “Man and his Doubles,” a chapter in Foucault’s The Order 
of Things. Foucault suggests in this chapter that for modern man the 
problem has moved beyond a Kantian one: “The question is no longer: 
How can experience of nature give rise to necessary judgments? But 
rather: How can man think what he does not think, inhabit as though 
by a mute occupation something that eludes him, animate with a kind 
of frozen movement that figure of himself that takes the form of a stub-
born exteriority?” (323). This is not a thinking differently, but is in fact 
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a thinking of the unthought, as Bhabha mentions, in order to reconcile 
man with his essence, or as Foucault mentions later: “[M]odern thought 
is advancing towards that region where man’s Other must become the 
Same as himself ” (328). These passages in Bhabha and Foucault critique 
thinking of the other as sameness for its failure to respect the limits 
of knowledge and the necessary difference and mystery of otherness. 
Foucault offers an important corrective about knowledge in this regard: 
“Ought we not to remind ourselves–we who believe ourselves bound to 
a finitude which belongs only to us, and which opens up the truth of 
the world to us by means of our cognition—ought we not to remind 
ourselves that we are bound to the back of a tiger?” (Foucault 322). As 
this passage comes after his discussion of Nietzsche’s thinking the end 
of man—“our humanism .  .  . [is] sleeping serenely over the threaten-
ing rumble of his non-existence” (322)—Foucault reminds us that our 
knowledge is limited and the category “man” is a fiction. For Foucault, 
thinking is possible not in thinking an unthought that reconciles man 
with his essence, but instead “the end of man, for its part, is the return 
of the beginning of philosophy. It is no longer possible to think in our 
day other than in the void left by man’s disappearance. For this void 
does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be 
filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space 
in which it is once more possible to think” (342). Like Deleuze and 
Guattari’s “becoming minoritarian,” which offers a political modality 
that critiques the idea of man—“white, male, adult, ‘rational’” (292)—
as occupying a central position in the universe and that challenges the 
notion of fixity that results from maintaining that category as dominant 
referent, Foucault argues that challenging the centrality and stability of 
“man” offers opportunities for thinking differently.
In Deleuze and Guattari, however, mimicry misses the desubjectify-
ing process of becoming. For them:
Mimicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to 
describe phenomena of an entirely different nature. The croco-
dile does not reproduce a tree trunk, any more than the cha-
meleon reproduces the colors of its surroundings. The Pink 
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Panther imitates nothing, it reproduces nothing, it paints the 
world its color, pink on pink; this is its becoming-world, car-
ried out in such a way that it becomes imperceptible itself, asig-
nifying, makes its rupture, its own line of flight. (11)
 Becoming then exceeds binary logic and clearly distinguished bounda-
ries, dualisms associated with man and his dominant thinking, whereas 
mimicry suggests mere imitation of a defined form or fixed being. 
Where mimicry only seems able to lead to a questioning of the author-
ity of subjectivity, the flow or flux of becoming offers a way of thinking 
differently about subjectivity in assemblages outside of being.
In The Impressionist, the protagonist’s early imitations of people and 
animals and his later adoption (sometimes forced) of other people’s 
identities as Rukhsana, Jonathan Bridgeman, etc., are modes of mimicry 
or at times uses of the ambiguity of hybridity that merely adopt fixed or 
dominant subjectivities. For example, in picking up Bridgeman’s iden-
tification card and performing Englishness, the protagonist adopts a 
dominant subjectivity and does not approach a becoming because “man 
is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings are minoritarian; all 
becoming is a becoming-minoritarian” (Deleuze and Guattari 291). For 
Deleuze and Guattari, becoming white-man cannot occur because this 
is a dominant or majoritarian position and all becomings move away 
from the logic of the Same to positively value difference. Indeed, the 
narrator describes how “[i]n his notebook he [the protagonist] writes, 
Englishness is sameness” (Kunzru 252; emphasis in original). In the case 
of the protagonist’s performing as Jonathan Bridgeman, he is able to 
convince others of his Englishness; however, he does so at the cost of 
having to perform dominant thinking. 
Critics have also discussed the novel’s representation of hybridity, 
suggesting that Kunzru’s novel offers a hybridity characterized by anxi-
ety rather than the positive theories of hybridity developed by Bhabha, 
Salman Rushdie, and others. For example, Barbara Schaff describes how 
theorists and writers like Stuart Hall and Hanif Kureishi view hybridity 
as an opportunity for creativity. In contrast, she argues that in the novels 
of Zadie Smith and Kunzru, the “optimistic view of the situation of 
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the migrant has been reconsidered” (282). Similarly, Aydemir’s reading 
questions the concepts of hybridity described by Bhabha, Robert Young, 
and Isabel Hoving, ultimately arguing that “because the main character’s 
hybridity remains consistently situated in, and focalized through, racist 
and purist ideologies, personified by specific characters, the novel pre-
vents the generalization and celebratory usage of the term” (208). The 
novel’s commentary on hybridity also critiques the concept’s lack of an 
ethics and values, resulting from its ambiguous nature. 
In Questioning Hybridity, Postcolonialism and Globalization, Amar 
Acheraïou takes up this problem with hybridity in a rather strong in-
dictment of many approaches to the concept, arguing that while it may 
have some potential for critique, hybridity discourse largely fails to 
remain anti-racist, to critique class, and to address the position of most 
people under colonial and neocolonial regimes who are not hybrids. 
Acheraïou argues:
At best, the postcolonial scholars’ enthusiastic support of am-
bivalence is a proof of non-commitment to anti-hegemonic 
global struggles and, at worst, it represents a tacit complicity 
with former colonial and today’s neocolonial structures of rule. 
We may further argue that the postcolonial celebration of hy-
bridity discourse’s ambivalence in the end sounds like a neoco-
lonial discursive practice. (154)
The Impressionist represents these problems with hybridity through the 
protagonist’s performance as Bridgeman. 
In a scene where his friend Gertler discusses his Jewishness and beliefs, 
the protagonist replies that he believes in nothing, a confirmation of the 
lack of values or ethics that can result from the ambiguity of hybridity. 
In contrast, Gertler offers his own ethical position: “I believe everyone 
should be equal” (Kunzru 252). Such a position maintains a set of values 
that challenges dominant thinking and, if extended to the realm of ani-
mals, falls in line with Braidotti’s ethics of “bio-centred egalitarianism.” 
She explains that in this position, “no animal is more equal than any 
other, because they are all equally inscribed in a logic of exchange that 
makes them disposable and hence negotiable” (Transpositions 99–100). 
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Braidotti develops this concept as a posthumanist alliance against this 
instrumentalization of bodies in late capitalism; the same problems 
appear for bodies in this novel representing the colonial period of the 
early twentieth century. Gertler remains committed to an anti-racist 
politics when he leads a group of rioters against an anti-Semitic rally, 
where, incidentally, the protagonist as Bridgeman finds himself on the 
side of the racist ralliers. The protagonist’s lack of values results from the 
ambiguity of his position of hybridity, which he manipulates for per-
sonal gain. As Acheraïou suggests, “Politically, the danger is even more 
serious. Because ambivalence or self-contradiction is apotheosized as a 
key constitutive feature of hybridity discourse, any clear-cut hierarchy 
of values is dismissed” (155). In light of the potential lack of values in 
hybridity, Kunzru’s novel posits “becoming animal” as a concept of the 
in-between with more political potential as it remains committed to a 
positive valuation of difference.
Resisting Mastery, Becoming Animal
Returning to an earlier scene in the novel, prior to his adoption of 
Jonathan Bridgeman’s identity and travel to England, the protagonist 
desires to escape dominant thinking and its resultant violence when he 
experiences an opportunity for “becoming animal” in his line of flight 
with tigers from Fatehpur. As Rukhsana in Fatehpur, the protagonist is 
forced to perform for the State in their attempt to manipulate colonial 
officials. For example, he is used as sexual bait for Privett-Clampe, seem-
ingly so that the royalty of Fatehpur can blackmail him or others by 
providing evidence of his sexual transgression, which they try to capture 
unsuccessfully with a camera. Similarly, the canned hunt is staged for 
the English colonial officers wherein caged tigers are drugged so that 
they will easily be killed by the awaiting shooters. Like the fixity associ-
ated with photography, hunting in this sense has the effect of ceasing the 
movement of these wild animals. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, “in 
the hunt the hunter’s aim was to arrest the movement of wild animality 
through systematic slaughter” (396). The hunters attempt to shoot the 
tigers as sport, like the picture wallah attempts to shoot images of the 
major and fix him in “compromising pictures” (131). These attempts to 
17
Re s i s t i ng  Co lon i a l  Ma s t e r y
master bodies cannot stop the constant shifting and relating of the world 
in its becoming, where neither matter nor subjects can be pinned down 
or defined and remain, at least in part, unknowable and unmasterable. 
Deleuze and Guattari warn: “Make maps, not photos or drawings” (25). 
The drugging of the tigers also suggests a desire to control their animal-
ity and agency. The hunt goes horribly awry, however, as the drugs have 
not been entirely successful and the civilized ritual is undone. “All is 
terror. All is panic” (Kunzru 140), as nonhuman agency asserts itself: 
the tigers escape, most characters experience diarrhea as their “stomachs 
(organs that are usually only intermittently present to their owners) have 
been changing state, becoming mobile” (Kunzru 137), one of the cam-
eras breaks, and the picture wallah is shot. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of photos and hunting and their im-
perative to “make maps” as an alternative may seem suspect given the 
colonial practice of using maps as tools in the service of the mainte-
nance of empire: controlling and seizing matter, people, animals, land, 
etc.; however, Deleuze and Guattari are not referring to maps as they 
are commonly understood. Indeed, early on in A Thousand Plateaus, 
they align their concept of maps with rhizomes, with lines of flight, 
with becoming, and therefore with the smooth space of the desert and 
nomads instead of the striated or organized and measured space of the 
State. They also discuss maps in terms of the unconscious, and while 
writing of the distinction between maps and “tracing” they remark that 
“[i]t is not a question of this or that place on earth” (20), indicating 
that they are clearly not dealing with maps in the common sense of the 
term. They continue to describe their notion of maps: “The rhizome is 
altogether different, a map and not a tracing. Make a map, not a trac-
ing. . . . What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely 
oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map 
does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs 
the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields” (12; emphasis 
in original). Their concept of map then seems to be more of a tool for 
taking account of the connections or assemblages that result from the af-
fectivity of matter and material forces, such as bodily forces, which may 
lead to lines of flight out of striated space or arborescent culture. Unlike 
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the Oedipus complex, to which they refer in the quote above as a trac-
ing of the unconscious and which attempts to define, fix, and represent 
the protean and unknown unconscious, limiting the potential of desire, 
their concept of maps attempts to approach the world as an inexact and 
unmeasured process in its becoming. They write of the relation of maps 
to the rhizome: “Unlike the graphic arts, drawing, or photography, 
unlike tracings, the rhizome pertains to a map that must be produced, 
constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, 
modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of 
flight” (21). Further still, while discussing how the sea is a “smooth 
space” that gets “striated” through geography, measurements, and map-
ping in the traditional sense, they describe smooth space much differ-
ently than colonial cartography: “In smooth space, the line is therefore a 
vector, a direction and not a dimension or metric determination. . . . It 
is haptic rather than optical perception” (478–79; emphasis in original). 
This emphasis on haptic perception suggests an embodied and therefore 
vulnerable experience of the world and the environment that is affective 
as opposed to the often disembodied, distanced position of mastery as-
sociated with the optical. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari’s “maps” in their 
relation to smooth space and becoming are maps without points that 
differ dramatically from the cartography used to organize and plot out 
space optically for the purposes of control and seizure as used in colonial 
ventures.
The chaotic scene in Fatehpur highlights how the characters associ-
ated with the State and colonialism desire mastery, like the mastery of 
traditional cartography, over other humans, nonhumans, and matter 
while emphasizing how nonhuman agency often upsets human designs. 
Hunting offers a “sense of mastery” for Privett-Clampe (Kunzru 97), as 
the narrator describes the importance of pigsticking for him: “Privett-
Clampe’s joy in pigsticking went deep. The thunderous beating of a 
horse’s great heart as he rode it hard over the rough .  .  . the delicious 
conjunction of judder and squeal as ‘Old Crusty’ impaled himself onto 
nine feet of hardened male bamboo—all of it reminded him that he was 
a man, that he had the upper hand, and the world and the creatures in it 
were his to dispose of as he saw fit” (97). While it seems he cannot con-
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trol or understand his desire, hunting offers a mastery that is nostalgic 
of a time when his “existence was once knowable and controllable” (95). 
Privett-Clampe cannot make his unthought desire known to himself, 
and his inability to master this exteriority that cannot be made the Same 
leads to his violence towards the Others of man as a way to bring them 
under his control and knowledge through death and instrumentaliza-
tion. While he cannot master the nonhuman of his subjectivity, as a 
colonial officer he rapes the protagonist and slaughters the animals of 
India—these other exteriorities to his “self ”—to maintain his sense of 
subjectivity and superiority. 
In “Eating Well,” Derrida describes the sacrificial nature of domi-
nant subject formation as part of “carnophallogocentrism” in a way 
that explains Privett-Clampe’s violent reactions to his lack of mastery of 
himself: “The virile strength of the adult male, the father, husband, or 
brother . . . belongs to the schema that dominates the concept of subject. 
The subject does not want just to master and possess nature actively. In 
our cultures, he accepts and eats flesh” (281). While Privett-Clampe 
does not eat meat in this scene, he certainly attempts to master nature 
as a mode of securing his subjectivity. In addition, as the epigraph from 
Huggan and Tiffin suggests, there is an overlap between Eurocentrism 
and anthropocentrism in viewing non-European and nonhuman others 
as suitable for control in the maintenance of a definition of the “human.” 
The failed hunting scene emphasizes how those regarded as nonhuman 
from the dominant perspective, including animals and non-Europeans, 
have the potential to resist this mastery and fixity, as the protagonist, 
whom Privett-Clampe has been teaching English poetry in an attempt 
to promote an English subjectivity, responds to Privett-Clampe’s plea 
saying, “I’m not your boy” (Kunzru 140).
The protagonist’s escape from Fatehpur at the conclusion of this scene 
suggests a literal and conceptual line of flight with the tigers and an 
opportunity for “becoming animal”: “[H]e carries on walking. After a 
while he realizes he is not alone. Four reflective eyes. A rumble of hot 
breath. The tigers have also had enough. They are leaving too. Together 
they walk on, heading toward the border with British India” (141). 
Leaving the dominant territory of the state, the protagonist and tigers 
20
Ja son  D .  Pr i c e
share the same space and movement as a way out of dominant modes 
of thinking and mastery. In the liminal space outside of Fatehpur, the 
protagonist regards the tigers as travelling companions, outside the 
metaphoric realm of narratives of domination like Privett-Clampe’s. In 
this scene, “[a]nimals are no longer the signifying system that props up 
humans’ self-projections and moral aspirations. Nor are they the keepers 
of the gates between species. They have, rather, started to be approached 
literally, as entities framed by code systems of their own” (Braidotti, 
“Animals, Anomalies” 528). The protagonist’s brief encounter with the 
tigers constitutes a line of flight; however, he takes another “dead end” 
when, following this scene, he returns to a more dominant mode of 
thinking in his adoption of the persona of Pretty Bobby in Bombay. Yet 
this is not the last of his opportunities for transformation. 
After adopting the identity of Jonathan Bridgeman and attending 
Oxford, the protagonist joins Professor Chapel’s group of anthropolo-
gists, and together they travel to Fotseland, a fictional location in Africa, 
for what turns out to be a colonial expedition. The protagonist reflects 
on the world of crabs on a riverbank, and upon returning to the anthro-
pological or colonizing mission, his thinking about subjectivity begins 
to change. The narrator remarks: 
Alone on the deck of the Nelly, with the shoreline flickering 
with silent shuffling Africans, his personal landmarks vanish 
one by one. After a quarter of an hour he feels uncertain, after 
half an hour actively fragile. By the time his two-hour stint is 
over, his boundaries have dissolved altogether and he is lost, or 
perhaps not so much lost as dispersed through the darkness, his 
turning world bereft of still points, radically uncertain about 
who or where or why he is, or even whether he has the right to 
call himself a he at all. (Kunzru 353)
The description of his loss of boundaries, knowable identity, and “still 
points” suggests the defamiliarization present in a “line of flight.” As op-
posed to a teleological move from point to point or the sedentary nature 
and fixity of a point, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the line without 
points as a minoritarian way of thinking or becoming: “Run lines, never 
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plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be quick, even when 
standing still! Line of chance, line of hips, line of flight” (24–25). For 
Forrester, the lack of teleology that resulted from his transformation was 
too much and led to his death, whereas the protagonist continues on, 
remaining in this uncertainty. The desubjectifying effects of this trans-
formation and lack of boundaries, as described in the passage quoted 
above, also suggest a critique of the interiority of the subject. 
During a journey down the river that evokes Marlow’s tale in Heart of 
Darkness, with the name of the boat alluding to the vessel in Conrad’s 
novel, the protagonist contemplates the world of what seem like hermit 
crabs: “He sits on the sand where the beach rakes sharply downward 
and spends an hour watching thumb-sized crabs scavenge the margin 
between land and sea. The beach stretches for miles. The crabs are oper-
ating on its entire length, a ribbon of tiny metropolitan bustle bisecting 
the stillness. There is something comforting about their little liminal 
world, something he does not want to leave” (Kunzru 346). Observing 
the world of the crabs or their Umwelt (320), to use Jakob von Uexküll’s 
term, the protagonist finds a sense of pleasure in their difference from 
the English world in which he is embedded as Jonathan Bridgeman. His 
comfort seems to result also from their marginal existence, in light of 
his own marginalization of being mixed-blood and therefore excluded 
by racial essentialism. In contrast to Marlow in Heart of Darkness, who 
feels comforted in finding a book about seamanship as he travels down 
the river—an object of signification and English cultural and capital-
ist production as it was written by a “Master in His Majesty’s Navy” 
(1980)—the protagonist of The Impressionist is comforted by the non-
human world of the crabs with their own mode of being in the world. 
In Heart of Darkness, Marlow appreciates the book’s “singleness of in-
tention” and its “honest concern for the right way of going to work” 
as a way of restoring his sense of his subjectivity after his experience of 
alienation at having encountered dramatically different environments 
and people on the journey down the river: the book helped him “forget 
the jungle and the pilgrims in a delicious sensation of having come upon 
something unmistakably real” (1980–81). Marlow further remarks that 
even though he just picked up the book, “to leave off reading was like 
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tearing . . . [himself ] away from the shelter of an old and solid friend-
ship” and that the book’s owner, who made many notes in it, “must be 
English” (1981), confirming that the restoration of his subjectivity is 
achieved through a recognition of sameness. Such a contrast in the char-
acters’ positions towards alienation and difference speaks to the ways in 
which they are enfranchised or disenfranchised by dominant or arbores-
cent culture with its notions of fixed subjectivity and binary categories 
of race. For the English character Marlow, returning to England at the 
end of the journey also restores his privileged position and sense of self, 
where the protagonist has never felt at home in England or at home in a 
racial category after being removed from his “father’s” house and learn-
ing of his mixed parentage. Rather than grasping for sameness and icons 
of Englishness to restore a dominant subjectivity as Marlow does, the 
multiracial protagonist follows through on the opportunity for a line of 
flight and a “becoming animal” as a way out of colonial binary logic and 
therefore embraces difference as positive.
Ron Broglio explains that one of the lessons we can learn from Uexküll 
is that “[t]he animal’s world creates for us a sense of wonder. It is sugges-
tively familiar and translatable, while in crucial ways remains stubbornly 
remote. Failures in translations create opportunities for reevaluating the 
privileged interiority of the human subject” (66). The protagonist’s inter-
est in the crabs results in part from the way he can only access the crabs 
at the level of surface and therefore much of their world remains closed 
to him. The crabs offer the possibility of an entirely different order and 
value system, bringing comfort to the protagonist through his sense of 
wonder at a world other than the English one he currently inhabits.
Becoming Ethical
I’ve discussed “becoming animal” as a way to resist the mastery of colo-
nial logic and its desire for complete knowledge and control of the world 
through fixity and turning difference into sameness. I now turn to the 
ethics of “becoming animal” and its positive appraisal of difference. In 
her discussion of Adorno’s materialism, Jane Bennet highlights the ethi-
cal importance of how we deal with uncertainties or that which exceeds 
our thinking. She writes of his project:
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[N]egative dialectics will render the static buzz of nonidentity 
into a powerful reminder that “objects do not go into their 
concepts without leaving a remainder” and thus that life will 
always exceed our knowledge and control. The ethical project 
par excellence, as Adorno sees it, is to keep remembering this 
and to learn how to accept it. Only then can we stop raging 
against a world that refuses to offer us the “reconcilement” that 
we, according to Adorno, crave. (14) 
The protagonist seems to be reminded of this excess and rather than 
raging against the world like dominant thinkers such as Privett-Clampe 
do, he seems to accept this lack of control. The crabs he observes exceed 
conceptualization, as does his own subjectivity, in a way reminiscent of 
Derrida’s description of his cat: “Nothing can ever take away from me 
the certainty that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be 
conceptualized” (“The Animal” 379). As Bennet describes “[t]hat rage 
is for Adorno the driving force behind interhuman acts of cruelty and 
violence,” and she suggests that we should “replace the ‘rage’ against 
nonidentity with a respect for it, a respect that chastens our will to mas-
tery” (15). By the end of the novel, the protagonist does not respond 
violently with rage or mastery to this limit of his knowledge but finds a 
way to respect it and respond ethically to the “world in its open-ended 
becoming” (Barad 139) as he lives in an assemblage with other humans 
and nonhumans.
Upon reaching the Fotse, the protagonist questions the anthropolo-
gists’ plans and offers a concern for the Fotses’ perspective that seems 
beyond the others: the Fotses’ interests are not even a consideration for 
the ethnocentric anthropologists. In an interesting passage that con-
fuses goats and the Fotse, the protagonist considers the Fotses’ desires: 
“‘What if they don’t want to go?’ asks Jonathan” (Kunzru 372). As part 
of his reply, Morgan offers, “If their goats were crossbred with European 
stock it would increase their weight” (372). Still speaking of the Fotse, 
Jonathan replies: “‘Don’t you think they’d rather be left alone?’ ‘The 
goats?’ scoffs Marchant. ‘The Fotse,’” replies Jonathan (373). In this 
brief exchange, the protagonist considers the worldview and agency of 
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the Fotse, which the other members of the expedition view as a weak-
ness of his character. His thinking about the Fotses’ interests and desires, 
however, marks his ethical consideration of the perspective of the Other, 
and therefore his difference from the English logic of the Same. For the 
anthropologists, both the Fotse and goats fail to produce to their full 
potential and therefore present an opportunity for the anthropologists 
to participate in the English civilizing mission to bring “progress” (372) 
by increasing economic productivity. As Morgan offers a plan to inter-
vene and maximize their production of capital by, among other things, 
bringing them into the global economy, Jonathan’s question challenges 
the universality and benevolence of Western notions of development. 
Where the anthropologists seek to “improve” the Fotse and their animals 
by making them the same, by making them more European, the pro-
tagonist recognizes that the Fotse have their own, different relationships 
to land and animals that exist outside of capitalist modes of extraction, 
and that they may resist this imposed “progress.” The confusion of Fotse 
and goats highlights again the agency and potential for resistance that 
humans and animals share, which colonial and capitalist regimes often 
elide or fail to consider. Like the protagonist and tigers who escaped 
from Fatehpur as described earlier, the Fotse actualize this potential for 
resistance to colonial mastery in their killing of everyone in Chapel’s 
expedition with the exception of the protagonist. 
Prior to the slaughter of the anthropologists, the protagonist undergoes 
a kind of rite of initiation into the Fotse community and the old man of 
the Fotse calls the English anthropologists “sorcerers,” telling Jonathan 
how the Fotse plan to deal with them: “[T]he time for the destruction 
of sorcery is now and the sorcerers the Fotse are preparing to act against 
are camped down in the valley. Before the morning all the white men 
will all be dead” (378). The old man’s choice of terms for describing the 
English as “sorcerers” is particularly interesting here since Deleuze and 
Guattari declare themselves sorcerers throughout A Thousand Plateaus. 
Given that the novel makes use of becoming throughout, this killing off 
of sorcerers is not a dismissal of Deleuze and Guattari’s entire project 
but a recognition that the relation between their book and Kunzru’s is 
also not a one-to-one or point-to-point relation. The Impressionist em-
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ploys their idea of “becoming animal,” but the novel cannot be confined 
or fixed to the limits of their concept: his novel exceeds and departs from 
it in important ways.
Like Acheraïou’s critique of hybridity for failing to address the con-
cerns of the average person under colonization, Donna Haraway’s cri-
tique of “becoming animal” recognizes that the concept fails to address 
most animals. She notes that Deleuze and Guattari mostly focus on the 
importance of the concept for humans. This is consistent with a larger 
trend, according to Haraway, in which many philosophers view animals 
as mere philosophical problems. In talking about Deleuze and Guattari’s 
“becoming animal,” Haraway writes, “here I find little but the two writ-
ers’ scorn for all that is mundane and ordinary and the profound absence 
of curiosity about or respect for and with actual animals, even as innu-
merable references to diverse animals are invoked to figure the authors’ 
anti-Oedipal and anticapitalist project. Derrida’s actual little cat is decid-
edly not invited into this encounter” (Haraway 27–28). The protagonist’s 
interactions with animals in the novel, and especially his encounter with 
a camel at the novel’s end, suggest Kunzru’s interest in responding to ani-
mals ethically, and not using them solely as a figure for thought.
The protagonist’s joining with the Fotse seems to appeal to a read-
ing consistent with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of nomadism—a 
concept that several critics have pointed to and criticized.4 However, 
I am interested here in the protagonist’s “becoming animal”—or more 
accurately his “becoming with” a camel. Haraway explains that:
[t]o knot companion and species together in encounter, in 
regard and respect, is to enter the world of becoming with, 
where who and what are is precisely what is at stake. . . . Species 
interdependence is the name of the worlding game on earth, 
and that game must be one of response and respect. . . . I am 
who I become with companion species, who and which make 
a mess out of categories in the making of kin and kind. (19; 
emphasis in original)
Haraway’s theorization of “becoming with” then emphasizes the ethics 
involved in responding to nonhuman others and the ways in which who 
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and what we are develop from our relations. Thus, stable subjectivity or 
“human” and “animal” do not pre-exist the relationship; rather, subjec-
tivity is made in the relating.
As the novel draws to a close, the protagonist finds himself once again 
walking alongside an animal, this time a camel: “His camel casts a jaun-
diced eye on him, and as he walks beside it he is careful to keep out of 
the way of its legs. Together they trudge up the gentle windward slopes 
of the dunes, sliding down each leeward face in an ankle-deep cascade 
of sand” (382–83). Their walking suggests a “becoming with” in com-
panionship, one where the protagonist responds to the animal’s gaze 
and recognizes the complexity involved in relating to the camel, with its 
different world. As Ron Broglio observes: 
An encounter with the animal is a moment in which we come 
to recognize an animal world, a moment when we are the 
object “over there.” In this look from another species, we real-
ize there are more points of view than our own, and that there 
are other optical and spatial phenomenologies than our all-
too-familiar human ones; indeed, animals and humans occupy 
the same earth and spaces but have different worlds, different 
Umwelts. (67–68)
These animal worlds remain in many ways beyond the scope of human 
knowledge, as Thomas Nagel argues in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” 
Rather than respond with violence to this exteriority, to this difference, 
the protagonist partakes in a “becoming with” that leads him out of the 
colonizing mission and into a positive relationship with a nonhuman 
animal.
The protagonist’s travel with the camels is not described with a goal 
or end, but more like Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “haecceity,” 
which “has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is 
always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines” (263). 
The narrator explains Jonathan’s thoughts on his current position: 
“For now the journey is everything. He has no thoughts of arriving 
anywhere. . . . Tomorrow he will travel on” (Kunzru 383). Rather than 
plotting points, his movement with the camels suggests an open-ended 
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future through his relating with an animal. For Braidotti, “entering 
into affirmative ethical relations, becoming animal or minoritarian 
engenders possible futures. They construct possible worlds through a 
web of sustainable interconnections” (“Animals, Anomalies” 531). The 
protagonist of The Impressionist, at least for the moment at the nov-
el’s ending, finds a way of thinking at the end of “man” in “becoming 
with” the animal that enables him to survive outside of the violence of 
colonial thought. 
In contrast to his earlier Oedipal membership in the family of Professor 
Chapel, the protagonist understands attachment as an assemblage of 
humans, nonhumans, and nonhuman matter. Recognizing the inter-
connectedness to the nonhuman is also a part of “becoming animal” in 
Braidotti’s formulation, as she describes a more animal-centric approach 
than Deleuze and Guattari, remarking that “becoming animal”
is a process of redefining one’s sense of attachment and con-
nection to a shared world, a territorial space. It expresses mul-
tiple ecologies of belonging, while it transforms one’s sensorial 
and perceptual coordinates, to acknowledge the collectiveness 
and outward direction of what we call the self. The nomadic 
subject is immersed in and immanent to a network of human 
and nonhuman (animal, vegetable, viral) relations. (“Animals, 
Anomalies” 530)
The narrator’s description of this kind of assemblage (373) decenters the 
human from agency, acknowledging his embeddedness in and interde-
pendence with the nonhuman and others.
This ethical relationship to others and the nonhuman in “becoming 
animal” differs greatly from his sustained adoption of the identity of 
the white, English character Jonathan Bridgeman, which seems moti-
vated by mostly self-interested purposes like gaining prestige, material 
wealth, and the other benefits of being an English male in the colonial 
period. Acheraïou writes of the eighteenth-century Caribbean that “[s]
eeking entry into the white world was synonymous with integrating 
into the space of the possible” (81), and this certainly seems to be the 
motivation of the protagonist as Bridgeman. Teresa Kay Williams’ cri-
28
Ja son  D .  Pr i c e
tique of the term “passing” is useful here for thinking about the state of 
affairs for people who are “mixed-race” like the protagonist. Discussing 
the situation for multi-racial people of Asian descent in America, she 
writes: “Passing in and of itself is problematic for multiracial individu-
als because it accepts and further reifies the exclusive, oppositionalized, 
unequal structure of race in which either fluidity across its boundaries or 
multiple situationality within many boundaries is not permitted” (167). 
To describe the protagonist’s behavior as “passing” then takes part in the 
maintenance of binaries, as Williams highlights. 
The problem with the protagonist as Bridgeman is not then an issue 
with “passing,” which would maintain dominant thinking and position 
him as unfaithful to a single “true” racial group; the problem is that he 
benefits from colonialism in a way similar to Acheraïou’s summary of 
Arif Dirlik’s commentary on some theorists of hybridity: “He [Dirlik], 
too, criticizes migrant postcolonial intellectuals for their privileged po-
sition, lack of real engagement with the postcoloniality of the former 
colonies, and abdication of their critical role. Ultimately, he insists that 
the postcolonial practitioners are not so much victims as beneficiaries of 
both colonialism and neocolonialism” (110). By benefitting in this way, 
the protagonist moves from an object of racial discrimination to a par-
ticipant in racist behavior in order to maintain his privileged position. 
As Bridgeman, he neglects responding ethically to those with whom he 
once was literally in the same boat. At a duck hunt in Fatehpur where 
royalty and colonial officials including Privett-Clampe participate, Pran 
and another captive servant are forced to retrieve, at significant risk, 
the dead birds from the lake mid-hunt. This demand positions Pran 
and the other servant as “disposable,” like the birds. The narrator de-
scribes how the hunt restores stability and comfort to the colonial of-
ficer: “For the major, the day’s slaughter is a respite, a moment out of a 
life he finds increasingly baffling” (Kunzru 95). After the hijra, Yasmin, 
replies that it is “very likely” to Pran’s question “But won’t they kill us?” 
while out on the lake in the boat, Pran “lives in constant fear that the 
next target will be him” (94). In the position of privilege as Bridgeman, 
he merely perpetuates this logic that once rendered himself and others 
disposable. 
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Acheraïou also explains that despite the fact that the very existence of 
people with mixed-blood shows that racial categories are unstable, “the 
position of many mixed-blood people towards colonial racial politics 
often turns out to be essentialist and mimetic” (82). This certainly seems 
to be true for the protagonist at times, especially in his devotion to stud-
ying what it means to be English. His desire for a relationship with an 
English or white woman also seems to be informed by his self-interested 
ambitions and his adoption of colonial racist logic. His desire for Star, 
Professor Chapel’s daughter, seems motivated by a Fanonian desire for 
whiteness. Acheraïou quotes a well-known passage from Fanon on this 
desire for whiteness in the Caribbean: “According to Fanon, such long-
ing for whiteness is reflected in the black/Antillean man’s sexual desire 
for the white woman; an erotic craving replete with psychological as 
well as political and ideological implications: ‘[In] the Negro who wants 
to go to bed with a white woman [looms] the wish to be white’ as well 
as a ‘lust for revenge’” (Acheraïou 80–81). Unlike the sexual encounter 
between Forrester and his mother Amrita at the beginning of the novel, 
a becoming wherein boundaries dissolved and subjects transformed, the 
protagonist’s desire for sex with a white woman is informed by a longing 
to stabilize a fixed subjectivity. His desire to marry Star is also a way for 
him to be more firmly rooted to an established family in a genealogical 
line of descent. 
In addition, as Bridgeman, he performs a dominant subjectivity by at-
tempting to control and master the unknown parts of himself, not unlike 
Privett-Clampe, which has the effect of stifling his criticism of racism 
and colonialism. While at a debate in Oxford, Bridgeman, “fingers un-
consciously fluttering[,] . . . began to speak about America, a speech that 
soon became about the West and then slid into the clash of color and 
the tide of racial movement on the shores of humanity and whiteness 
whiteness whiteness until he realized what he was doing and sat down. 
Sometimes it comes out, the guilt. He has to watch for it” (277–78). 
The speech comes from an unknown part of himself, beyond his control 
as indicated by his unconscious movements and unbidden feelings of 
guilt. As his speech gets summarized as a critique of “the White Man’s 
mission to ‘farm the world’” (277), it is clear that the protagonist has 
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the desire to think differently and critique colonialism and yet, aside 
from this unwelcome and unintended outburst, he refuses to become 
ethical in order to maintain his privileged position. Braidotti offers an 
important commentary on the nonhuman life force of zoe that is part of 
our selves in relation to dominant thought: “Consciousness attempts to 
contain it [zoe], but actually lives in fear of it. Such a life force is experi-
enced as threatening by a mind that fears the loss of control. This is the 
dominant view of consciousness as feeding on negative passions: a clear-
ing house of the kind of neuroses (such as narcissism and paranoia) that 
are rewarded in the socialized civilized West” (Transpositions 110–11). 
As Bridgeman, the protagonist then merely joins the privileged group 
of white Englishmen, on the other side of the gun to continue in the 
language of the hunting scene, instead of critiquing the logic that posi-
tions them as central and above others. His renunciation of the role of 
Bridgeman and his “becoming animal” towards the novel’s open ending 
clearly position him as more ethical towards others and the nonhuman 
than when he is the narcissistic Bridgeman.
In this way, Kunzru calls for more ethical responses from those in 
positions of power and offers a corrective to hybridity and “becoming 
animal,” which are often conceived of with only the benefits for those 
hybrid subjects and subjects of becoming in mind. In the protagonist’s 
walk with a camel and the Fotse towards the novel’s end, Kunzru posi-
tions his hybrid character in solidarity with animals and native people 
as an ethical stance against their shared exploitation. Braidotti explains 
that “[b]io-centred egalitarianism is . . . a materialist, secular, precise and 
unsentimental response to a transversal, trans-species structural con-
nection of those whose bodies are ‘disposable’ in the logic of advanced 
capitalism” (Transpositions 99). While her construction of “biocentred 
egalitarianism” responds to current neocolonial regimes of power in 
global capitalism, her proposal of transpecies solidarity centred around 
“disposable bodies” offers an ethics that proves useful for responding 
to the problems of the British colonial period of the early twentieth 
century in which Kunzru’s novel is set. In The Impressionist, the bodies 
of those regarded as disposable are more often categorized as such not 
because they are commodified as capital as in Braidotti’s description of 
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late capitalism and in colonial narratives like Heart of Darkness; instead, 
they are usually disposed of in service to a dominant view of the sub-
ject and “humanity” through mastery and control. To be sure, Kunzru’s 
novel also addresses the capitalist impulse of colonization in a number 
of cases: for example, when the protagonist is made a child sex slave; 
during his speech critiquing the white man’s desire to farm the world; 
when he questions the anthropologists’ plans of removing the Fotse from 
their land in the name of “progress” (372) and development; and when 
the anthropologist desires to hybridize Fotse goats with English stock 
to increase their milk productivity. The Impressionist therefore critiques 
capitalist instrumentalization of Others as commodities but largely fo-
cuses its attention on the problem of the transformation of people and 
animals into “disposable bodies” in sacrifice to the logic of the Same, 
to a particular definition of Man, and to the maintenance of European 
Man’s cultural hegemony. In The Impressionist, Kunzru offers a postcolo-
nial ecocriticism that stems from the nonhumanness of the subject and 
the body, which presents opportunities for alliance in resistance to the 
mastery that renders people, animals, and the environment disposable, 
whether for profit or for sacrifice to this logic. 
Notes
 1 Aydemir reads the novel in terms of nomadism. He also notes Forrester’s associa-
tion with the arborescent in his mission to plant trees in India and describes how 
the book is framed: 
  The outer frame that the book’s narrative traces from its beginning to its 
ending moves from trees to grass, and hence, from the arborescent to the 
rhizomatic, in terms supplied by Deleuze and Guattari in their introduc-
tion to A Thousand Plateaus.  .  .  . Trees and grass respectively mark The 
Impressionist’s protagonist’s birth at the beginning of the novel and his 
rebirth at its conclusion. (212) 
 2 Material flows and semiotic flows do not exist in different realms but often work 
together or alongside one another—they “intra-act,” to use Barad’s term. Hara-
way cites the importance of Barad’s concept for her theorization of “becoming 
with.” In addition, Deleuze and Guattari point to the relating of matter and 
semiotics: “An assemblage, in its multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic flows, 
material flows, and social flows simultaneously. . . . There is no longer a tripartite 
division between a field of reality (the world) and a field of representation (the 
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book) and a field of subjectivity (the author)” (22–23). See also Barad’s critique 
of representationalism in “Posthumanist Performativity,” which delegitimizes 
the power of words to fix the world.
 3 The protagonist’s lack of interiority in the novel also suggests his affinity with 
thinking differently and with animals as Broglio explains in Surface Encounters 
that the surface is the space traditionally allotted to animals. Broglio ponders, 
“how does the animal and its noninteriority produce thought differently?” (81). 
The lack of interiority in the protagonist’s character confirms Kunzru’s attempt 
at staying on the surface as a mode of thinking differently and therefore seems to 
meet Deleuze and Guattari’s criteria for “the ideal for a book” (9). 
 4 Nyman has also considered a reading of the novel in light of Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s theories: “While it may be suggested that this newly emergent identity is 
linked with a critique of naturalized subject positions . . . in the sense proposed 
by Deleuze and Guattari (1988) where the fixed location of the self is replaced 
with a nomadic or exilic selfhood, such a reading is complicated by the fact that 
nomadism also represents a modernist fantasy of primitivism” (106). Perhaps 
this critique is another reason for Kunzru killing off the English anthropologists 
as “sorcerers.” Aydemir acknowledges this charge of primitivism in his discussion 
of nomadism while also highlighting Miller’s critique which charges nomadism 
with representing “orientalist stereotypes” and offering a “view of the desert as 
empty, and hence readily inviting and legitimizing conquest” (214). These cri-
tiques of nomadism’s orientalism are warranted, and yet they do not take into ac-
count that nomadism is a concept related to the larger importance of becoming 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s project. That is, the figure of the nomad emphasizes a 
difference from sedentary and fixed subjectivity toward a transformational one 
that is never fully definable or masterable. Also, I concur with Aydemir in his 
disagreement with Miller’s second charge, as for Deleuze and Guattari, the desert 
is populated by nomads who constitute a “war machine,” which threatens the 
control of space by colonizers. Indeed, the desert is also populated with animals 
that offer their own resistances, as Armstrong argues: “Defined as that bit of 
nature endowed with voluntary motion, the animal resists the imperialist desire 
to represent the natural—and especially the colonial terrain—as a passive object 
or a blank slate ready for mapping by Western experts” (415). 
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